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FRANCESCO ORSI
Tartu University
MORAL JUDGMENT, SENSITIVITY TO REASONS,
AND THE MULTI-SYSTEM VIEW
ABSTRACT: In this paper I attempt a critical examination of
the multi-system or dual-process view of moral judgment. This
view aims to provide a psychological explanation of moral sensi-
tivity, and in particular an explanation of conflicting moral sensi-
tivities in dilemma cases such as the crying baby scenario. I argue
that proponents of the multi-system view owe us a satisfactory ac-
count of the mechanisms underlying “consequentialist” responses
to such scenarios. For one thing, the “cognitive” processes in-
volved in consequentialist reasoning only seem to play a subserv-
ing role with respect to the final judgment (providing non-moral
inputs to judgment, or exerting additional strength to override
the immediate “deontological” response). In this sense, Greene
and colleagues fail to identify a peculiar system of moral judg-
ment specularly opposed to the affective “deontological” one. For
another, Greene and colleagues’ work on the emotion-cognition
dichotomy and the distinction between alarm-bell and currency
emotions, though promising, still falls short of providing an ad-
equate and consistent picture of the psychological mechanisms
underlying “cognitive” evaluations and verdicts in dilemma sce-
narios. It is suggested that alongside further experimental work,
proponents of this view should pay more attention to the concep-
tual underpinnings of their distinctions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I aim to critically examine the contribution that a certain
psychological account of moral judgment, the multi-system view, can
offer to the understanding of moral judgment. In the first part I intro-
duce the notion of sensitivity to reasons, and briefly argue that it is a
central component of our conception of moral judgment, a component
that any theory of moral judgment should explain. In the second part, I
introduce the multi-system view as developed in particular by F. Cush-
man and J. Greene in a number of papers. I will argue that such a view
suffers from a problem of functional asymmetry among systems.
2. MORAL JUDGMENT AND SENSITIVITY TO REASONS
Sensitivity to moral reasons is an ineliminable component of moral
judgment. In order to decide the moral status of an action, we need
to ascertain the facts of the matter, and decide if they are morally rele-
vant, that is, if they provide moral reasons for or against an action. This
is because the moral status of an action depends on the moral reasons
for or against the action. When the balance of moral reasons is against
performing an action, then the action is morally wrong, or ought not
to be done. When the balance of moral reasons favours performing an
action, then the action is morally good and possibly obligatory. In sum,
in order to judge an action, we need to be sensitive to the moral rea-
sons. Sensitivity to reasons is thus the capacity to recognize normative
facts, that is, to recognize certain facts as moral reasons for or against
an action. The exercise of such capacity may go wrong in many ways
of course: e.g. I may wrongly think that the fact that somebody has
insulted me is a good moral reason to cut their throat. Or sometimes
we may fail to exercise this sensitivity when we should: e.g. knowing
well that she is in pain, I may fail to recognize my victim’s pain as a
reason to stop torturing her.
Sensitivity to reasons is present both in moral action and in moral
judgment in actual or hypothetical stituations. Consider the crying
baby case, much discussed in the psychological literature (and which I
will return to below):
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have
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orders to kill all remaining civilians. You and some of your
townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a large
house. Outside, you hear the voices of soldiers who have
come to search the house for valuables. Your baby begins
to cry loudly. You cover his mouth to block the sound. If
you remove your hand from his mouth, his crying will sum-
mon the attention of the soldiers who will kill you, your
child, and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save your-
self and the others, you must smother your child to death.
Is it appropriate for you to smother your child in order to
save yourself and the other townspeople?
Here, in order to decide what we ought to do, we must identify the rea-
sons for or against alternative actions, weigh them, and decide which
action is favoured by the balance of reasons. Whatever we conclude (it
is permissible/obligatory/wrong to smother our child), we will have
displayed our sensitivity to the reasons in the situation. Minimally, we
will have recognized both the fact that we would be killing our child as
a reason not to smother her, and the fact that if we let her cry, every-
body will be killed as a reason to smother the poor child.
Sensitivity to reasons is a central component of moral judgment,
for a subject who makes a moral judgment must be disposed to justify
it with moral reasons. It is part of what makes a moral judgment some-
thing else than a mere subjective preference that we are ready to give
reasons for it. If we think that an action is wrong, we will think that
something about the action (or about the agent, or about the conse-
quences) makes it wrong, and for this reason we judge it to be wrong.
J. Haidt’s research may seem to pose two challenges to the impor-
tance of sensitivity to reasons. One is the idea that ‘justifying a judg-
ment with reasons’ is often just the result of post hoc rationalizations
(Haidt 2001). The suggestions here is that in expressing moral judg-
ments we voice primarily our preferences or prejudices, and only later,
if pressured, do we come up with some rationally acceptable justifica-
tion.
However, nobody denies that reasons for judgments might not con-
sciously or explicitly guide our judgments. Instead, the very pressure
to say something in defence of our judgment shows that we know we
would not be making a moral judgment otherwise, but only voicing a
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preference or prejudice of ours. If we want our judgment to be a moral
judgment, there is nothing wrong with trying to find our reasons post
hoc. In fact, engaging in the more or less conscious task of looking for
our reasons, regardless of success, is enough to show that our judgment
is a moral one.
The second apparent challenge is the persistence of certain judg-
ments despite a recognized inability to give reasons for them. Haidt’s
example is the widespread judgment that an incestous act between
brother and sister would be wrong, despite the absence of any physi-
cal or emotional harm or other negative consequences for all involved
(Haidt 2001).
Two remarks are in place. First, people who stick to their judgments
though unable to justify them might nonetheless still be disposed to
provide a reason, if they could find it. That is, they can acknowledge
that a reason is needed—even when all they are able to come up with
is the irrelevant self-report that ‘it just feels wrong’. Second, Haidt
shows little charity to an obvious alternative: sexual intercourse be-
tween close relatives may be perceived as morally wrong on its own
right, and not for further reasons. Those who stick to their judgment
may perceive incest as a morally wrong type of act (like killing the in-
nocent), thus needing no further reasons to judge an instance of it as
wrong.
Therefore, it seems quite plausible that an essential feature of moral
judgments is the subject’s disposition to give reasons for them, thus
exercising their sensitivity to (moral) reasons. In the next sections I
argue that a prominent psychological approach to moral judgment, the
multi-system or dual-process view, cannot account for this aspect of
moral judgment.
3. THE MULTI-SYSTEM VIEW
A number of authors, such as J. Greene and F. Cushman, have pro-
posed that the best explanation of certain patterns of moral judgment
in response to hypothetical scenarios is that two, or more, dissociable
psychological mechanisms are at work when engaging in moral deci-
sions. I concentrate here on the multi-system view as the best explana-
tion for differences in judgments concerning the crying baby scenario
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illustrated above, leaving aside its application to the well known trolley
problem cases (Greene et al. 2001).
When presented with the crying baby scenario, people divide over
what they ought to do (Greene et al. 2004). Some judge it permis-
sible to smother the baby, some judge it impermissible. Where does
the difference lie? Data from fMRI has been thought to help provide
an answer. Some patterns of brain activation and reaction times are
common to both categories of subject:1
1) In both categories of subjects, brain regions associated with emo-
tion and social cognition show increased activation. Those areas
(the posterior cingulated cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex, and
the amygdala) are also active in other cases of potential personal
harm, like the “footbridge” case, or an infanticide case where a
mother simply kills her newborn baby for no apparent reason;
2) Both categories of subjects have high reaction times, compared to
judgments on cases (like the infanticide just mentioned) where the
judgment is relatively quick. The high reaction times evidence that
both categories of subject are engaged in “abstract reasoning” of the
kind that is required by a cost-benefit analysis. Both subjects seem
to be weighing the costs and benefits of either outcome, irrespective
of their eventual judgment (Greene et al. 2004, p. 396);
3) Both categories of subjects show increased activity in brain regions
(anterior cingulated cortex) associated with the detection of cogni-
tive conflict.
It is natural to interpret this cognitive conflict as arising from an oppo-
sition between the neuropsychological processes alluded to in (1) and
(2). Presumably, the emotional reaction in (1) is negative—prohibiting
smothering the baby—whereas the result of the cost-benefit analysis is
positive—favouring smothering the baby. The crucial difference be-
tween the two categories of subjects seems to lie in the differential
activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the inferior pari-
etal cortex. Subjects judging that smothering the baby is permissible
show higher activation of these areas than subjects judging that it is
not permissible. Now, these brain regions are associated with a kind of
function which Greene et al. (2004) term “cognitive” (or “regulative”)
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“control” (presumably following Miller & Cohen 2001). In (Greene
et al. 2004, p. 396), these regions are said to play an important role in
the regulation of potentially counterproductive emotions in many con-
texts: social decision-making, placebo effects, the evaluation of trade-
offs between future and immediate rewards. In (Greene 2007, p.46)
the associated functions are the following: executive control, complex
planning, deductive and inductive reasoning, taking the long view in
economic decision making. Finally, Cushman & Greene (in press) also
mention “thinking guided by explicit rules” (p. 2).
These lists are clearly a mixed bag. However, in light of previous
evidence that such “cognitive” regions are associated with utilitarian
kinds of judgments in cases such as the “switch” version of the trolley
(Greene et al. 2001), Greene and colleagues suggest that the function
of the increased activation of these regions in subjects judging it per-
missible to smother the baby is to respond to the cognitive conflict by
overriding the strong, negative emotional reaction to the prospect of
smothering one’s baby, and allowing the evaluation based on the cost-
benefit analysis (very roughly: many lives are worth more than one,
or an outcome where one ends up killed is better than an outcome
where everybody ends up killed) to decide the conflict. By contrast,
in subjects judging it impermissible to smother the baby, the “cognitive
control” mechanisms are not strong enough to override the negative
emotional reaction.
Based on these and further neuroscientific data,2 Greene and col-
leagues argue that different systems are in play in these moral judg-
ments (Greene 2007; Cushman & Young 2009; Cushman et al. 2010;
Cushman & Greene in press). When a situation presents the possi-
bility of personally harming someone to save others, an emotional or
affective system reacts to the input with a strong negative response.
At the same time, abstract reasoning systems underlie the realization
that by harming one we can save others—some form of cost-benefit
analysis is performed here. The perceived conflict between the alter-
natives is the result of the clash of these systems. Eventually, one’s
final judgment will depend on the work of mechanisms of “cognitive
control”. Importantly, since both the affective and the ’cold’ systems
are demanding our attention, “no matter what you do, part of you is
going to be dissatisfied” with the eventual moral decision (Cushman &
Vol. 7: Morality and the Cognitive Sciences
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Young 2009, p. 19). As Cushman and Young put it, “the moral mind
is a constellation of distinct cognitive processes that can operate inde-
pendently, often interact, and sometimes compete” (Cushman & Young
2009, p. 11).
Now, in proposing the competition between these mechanisms as
explaining the psychology of moral judgment in conflict cases, Cush-
man and Young encourage the idea that a multi-system view has all
the features needed to explain the sensitivity to reasons of moral judg-
ment:
First, the mechanisms can each be characterized by dis-
tinct axioms. Second, the mechanisms produce opposing
judgments in an identical category, such as a normative
demand on action or a judgment of responsibility. Third,
the demands on and judgments of behavior produced by
each mechanism are inherently non-negotiable—these do
not represent mere votes in favor of a particular conclusion
but rather require a particular conclusion. (Cushman &
Young 2009, p. 17, see also 15–6, and Cushman & Greene
in press).
The authors credit the mechanisms with a rich conceptual articulation
that mirrors the articulation of an exercise of sensitivity to moral rea-
sons.3 The systems process the factual inputs—representations of pos-
sible actions, harms, alternative outcomes—by causally responding to
them in an ‘affective’ or a ‘cold’ fashion, which includes the possibility
of a conflict, understood as a conflict of purely psychological impulses.
According to Cushman and Young, each system is better described
as assigning an evaluation to the inputs in accordance with its own
axioms, and generating its own final moral verdict (a non-negotiable
demand). In the crying baby case, the affective system applies the
axiom “It is prohibited to do harm to an individual as a means to an
end”—or a more specific one—and generates the verdict that it would
be absolutely wrong to smother the baby. In other words, the affective
system takes the prospect of killing the baby as a means to an end
as a sufficient and decisive reason not to smother the baby. On the
other hand, the ’cold’ system, recognizing that it would be worse to
let all be killed than to kill one, applies some consequentialist axiom
such as “It is required to minimize overall harm”, and demands that
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one’s child be sacrificed. The ‘cold’ system thus displays a sensitivity
to other facts of the scenario as decisive reasons to smother the baby
(namely the fact that everyone would be killed otherwise). Moreover,
the ensuing dilemma is represented as a full-blown normative conflict
between contradictory verdicts rather than merely a battle of opposing
impulses.
4. CRITICISM: FUNCTIONAL ASYMMETRY
I present here a criticism of the multi-system view understood as an
attempt to capture the psychological structure of sensitivity to reasons
in moral judgment. This is not meant to be a decisive objection to
any multi-system account, but rather as a difficulty that a more careful
analysis and formulation of the view might in the future overcome.
I call the problem a “functional asymmetry” between mechanisms.
The structure of the objection is the following. Systems are function-
ally symmetrical when they “do the same kind of job”. In this case, the
job is to be sensitive to moral reasons: to process independently given
inputs (representations of the facts of the matter) and yield a moral
verdict based on them. If the systems are not functionally symmetrical
in this sense, then they cannot be opposed to one another in such a
way as to give rise to a moral conflict, i.e. a perceived conflict between
moral reasons. If they cannot be opposed in such a way, then they do
not represent competing sensitivities to moral reasons. But, as I will
argue, the systems have not been shown to be functionally symmetri-
cal. Therefore they do not represent competing sensitivities to moral
reasons.
Exactly which are the systems that are supposed to compete?
Greene and colleagues unfortunately give less than a satisfactory or
univocal answer. On the one hand, it seems that there is an affective
system which responds, with a negative reaction, to an independently
given input, namely representations such as the prospect of the child’s
death, or more likely the physical action of smothering one’s own child.
The affective system thus operates upon inputs that have already been
“taken in” thanks to the work of other cognitive mechanisms (presum-
ably perspective-taking, and perhaps simulated motor planning—see
Cushman & Greene (in press). This makes it a candidate apparatus
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for sensitivity to reasons: sensitivity to reasons works upon facts which
have already been cognitively digested by the subject.
However it is far from clear what in the opposing ‘cold’ system does
a kind of job comparable to the affective reaction. When describing
this separate system, Greene and colleagues mention increased activa-
tion in brain areas associated with basically two cognitive functions or
processes: abstract reasoning, and all that goes under “cognitive con-
trol”. Let’s start with the latter. As pointed out, the “job” of cognitive
control is to override the emotional response and let the ‘cold’ verdict
win out. Therefore such a function could only logically and psycho-
logically follow an already reached ‘cold’ verdict (kill the one to save
the many). Cognitive control is part of the ‘cold’ system only to the
extent that it is “recruited” by such a system to contrast the negative
emotional reaction once the verdict has already been represented by
some other mechanism. Even though the “utilitarian” verdict could not
guide our judgment without a sufficiently strong cognitive control, the
exercise of cognitive control is not the locus of the “utilitarian” verdict
in the way that emotional processes are (or at least seem to be) both
the locus of the “deontological” verdict and the driving force behind
the eventual deontological judgment.
The remaining candidate process is “the abstract reasoning that
constitutes a utilitarian analysis” (Greene et al. 2004, p. 396). In the
specific crying baby case, the output of such process is the “abstract,
‘cognitive’ understanding that, in terms of lives saved/lost, one has
nothing to lose (relative to the alternative) and much to gain by carry-
ing out this horrific act” (ibid: 390). When pitted against the negative
emotional reaction, in some people “this ‘cognitive,’ cost-benefit analy-
sis wins out, and these people say ‘yes”’ (Greene 2007, p. 46). Engaging
in a cost-benefit analysis must surely precede the operation of cogni-
tive control, and is somehow relevant to arriving at the judgment that
it is permissible to smother the baby. However, it is not clear exactly
how it is relevant. There seem to be two possibilities: (1) abstract rea-
soning as a calculation of the alternatives; (2) abstract reasoning as an
evaluation of the alternatives.
If abstract reasoning just is the performance of calculation of the al-
ternative outcomes, relative to lives saved/lost (smothering the baby:
one life lost, many lives saved; not smothering the baby: no lives
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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saved), then abstract reasoning is engaged in generating some relevant
inputs to the moral judgment, rather than in responding to indepen-
dently given inputs. Abstract reasoning thus cannot be a mechanism of
moral sensitivity symmetrically opposed to the affective one, but per-
forms an evaluatively neutral preliminary function akin to that played
by, say, simulated motor planning when we represent the prospect of
physically smothering the child, while leaving it to some other process
to evaluate the alternative outcomes and prescribe a certain course of
action.
On the other hand, abstract reasoning could have a jointly calcu-
lative and evaluative/prescriptive function, generating both the rele-
vant inputs in terms of lives saved/lost, and the evaluative output that
smothering the baby is the best outcome in terms of lives saved—plus
the prescriptive demand that this is what we morally ought to do. Such
a mechanism would thus be symmetrically parallel to the affective pro-
cess, issuing the opposed and conflicting verdict.
This idea is attractive and sensible—indeed, it seems to be the only
sensible way to respond to the functional asymmetry objection as we
set it up—but a few problems remain to be solved. The first one stems
from the experiment design itself, and seems to have gone unnoticed
so far. It is not obvious that the “abstract reasoning” process yields a
bona fide moral evaluation. As it is described, in the crying baby case
the agent’s life is as much at stake as the others’, and the research sub-
jects are asked to identify with the agent. The cost to oneself of not
smothering the baby is nothing less than being killed. Smothering the
baby thus crucially means saving oneself. So, it might be that in issuing
the judgment that it is appropriate or permissible or even obligatory to
smother the baby to save the most people, the subjects are actually ex-
pressing the result of a prudential kind of cost-benefit analysis, which
in this case happens to coincide with the consequentialist verdict. In
the absence of further control experiments, it cannot be ruled out that
the cognitive system might, in this case, simply be guided by a pruden-
tial bias towards saving one’s life rather than issue an impartial moral
judgment based on some consequentialist principle. If the former is the
case, then the abstract reasoning process is not producing a symmetri-
cally opposed verdict “in an identical category”, as Cushman & Young
require (2009, p. 17).
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A second problem can be appreciated by looking at the details and
the more speculative parts of Greene’s theory. This requires a separate
treatment.
5. FROM EMOTION VS. COGNITION TO ALARM-BELL VS. CURRENCY
EMOTIONS
Which mechanisms realize the evaluative and prescriptive function
played by “utilitarian” abstract reasoning? The answer, we know, is
“cognitive” mechanisms as opposed to affective or emotional mecha-
nisms. We also know from the previous section that “cognitive” mech-
anisms involved in (1) cognitive control and (2) mere calculation play
at most a supporting or subservient function with respect to the “util-
itarian” judgment. What we are looking for is therefore another sort
of “cognition”. Greene and colleagues’ work offers at this point two
possible directions to address the question: i) an elaboration of the
dichotomy emotion vs. cognition, ii) a distinction between two differ-
ent kinds of emotions related to “deontological” and “consequentialist”
moral judgment.
Greene has suggested that the emotion/cognition dichotomy, which
seems to underlie the deontology/consequentialism divide, is better
understood as a difference in degree rather than in kind. In particu-
lar, the distinction is in terms of the motivational impact of different
representations:
[O]ne might render the emotion/cognition distinction in
terms of a contrast between, on the one hand, representa-
tions that have direct motivational force and, on the other
hand, representations that have no direct motivational force
of their own, but that can be contingently connected to
affective/emotional states that do have such force, thus
producing behavior that is both flexible and goal directed
(Greene et al. 2004, p. 397–8).
In his 2007 paper, Greene elaborates a bit further:
The rough idea is that “cognitive” representations are in-
herently neutral representations, ones that do not auto-
matically trigger particular behavioral responses or dispo-
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sitions, while “emotional” representations do have such au-
tomatic effects, and are therefore behaviorally valenced...
Highly flexible behavior requires “cognitive” representa-
tions that can be easily mixed around and recombined as
situational demands vary, and without pulling the agent in
sixteen different behavioral directions at once. For exam-
ple, sometimes you need to avoid cars, and other times you
need to approach them. It is useful, then, if you can repre-
sent CAR in a behaviourally neutral or “cognitive” way, one
that doesn’t automatically presuppose a particular behav-
ioral response. Stereotyped behavior, in contrast, doesn’t
require this sort of flexibility and therefore doesn’t require
“cognitive” representations, at least not to the same extent
(Greene 2007, p. 40).
The idea thus would be that consequentialist judgment is character-
ized by “cognitive”, i.e. motivationally neutral representations, which
need external support (e.g. from mechanisms of cognitive control) to
“impose themselves” and guide our decisions and behaviour. No such
support is needed for the “emotional” representations characterizing
deontological judgment, whose motivational impact is immediate.
However, this distinction does not help with our question, because
it does not help us to identify the “cognitive” mechanism which un-
derlies consequentialist judgment. On the basis of the distinction, we
could say that a mechanism is cognitive (as opposed to affective) if the
representations which it generates are cognitive, i.e. motivationally
neutral. But what kind of representations does Greene have in mind?
On the one hand, he might think of structured, explicitly morally or
evaluatively valenced representations, such as “five lives saved are bet-
ter than no lives saved” for the consequentialist judgment, and “smoth-
ering my baby is absolutely wrong” for the deontological judgment.
One might then assume that the first type of representations are moti-
vationally neutral whereas the second type are intrinsically motivating
(immediately inducing me to reject the option of smothering the baby).
However, this way of understanding the emotion/cognition dichotomy
does not obviously distinguish separate mechanisms. For representa-
tions such as “five lives saved are better than no lives saved” are very
likely to be intrinsically motivating in non-dilemmatic situations, when
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there is no countervailing factor, inducing us to do what we can to save
the five. Therefore, a mechanism cannot be said to be “cognitive” in-
sofar as it generates representations with such a content, because such
representations can well be “emotional”, i.e. intrinsically motivating.
On the other hand, it is possible that Greene has in mind factual
or descriptive representations, as the example of CAR suggests. CAR is
represented in a neutral fashion, because it does not automatically trig-
ger a response of attraction or repulsion. The idea would then be that
the structured factual representations on which consequentialist judg-
ment depends are motivationally neutral, whereas the factual repre-
sentations on which deontological judgment depends are “emotional”.
However, such an idea is dubious and does not help identify distinct
mechanisms. First, consequentialist and deontological judgments oper-
ate on some shared factual representations in the crying baby case, e.g.
the representation “me smothering my baby by hand”. This same rep-
resentation is at once emotional and cognitive: it is emotional insofar
as it triggers an automatic response of repulsion, and cognitive insofar
as it is factored in as a “cost”, but not rejected outright in the con-
sequentialist evaluation. Moreover, the factual representation “more
lives saved than killed” which drives the consequentialist judgment is
not “inherently neutral”: it surely must automatically trigger some pos-
itive response, at least when considered in abstraction from the means
of saving the lives. So representations are not cognitive or emotional
on the basis of their content (be it evaluative or factual): the same
representation can be emotional and cognitive at the same time or at
different times given appropriate circumstances. But then the cognitive
or emotional nature of representations cannot be a good guide to the
cognitive or emotional nature of the mechanisms. In particular, one
cannot say that the mechanism underlying consequentialist judgment
is cognitive because it generates (or operates upon) cognitive represen-
tations in this sense.
The second theoretical option intends to go beyond the emo-
tion/cognition dichotomy, and starts from a difference between two
kinds of emotions related to “deontological” and “consequential-
ist” moral judgment. Greene and colleagues have recently de-
veloped a somewhat speculative distinction between two types of
emotional processing: ‘alarm-bell’-like and ‘currency’-like (Greene
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2007; Cushman et al. 2010). According to their hypothesis, alarm-
bell emotions—immediate, vivid and motivationally demanding—
underlie deontological judgments in cases such as the crying baby,
whereas currency emotions—being mediated by reasoning, more sub-
tle and “provisional”—underlie consequentialist reasoning and judg-
ment. Given that both verdicts are thus ultimately based on emo-
tional responses of some kind, Greene asserts his multi-system or dual-
process view to be “sympathetic to Hume’s claim that all moral judg-
ment (including consequentialist judgment) must have some emotional
component” (Greene 2007, p. 41).
Here is how Cushman et al. understand the distinction and point
to possible neural localizations of the respective processes:
The core idea is that alarm-bell emotions are designed to
circumvent reasoning, providing absolute demands and con-
straints on behavior, while currency emotions are designed
to participate in the process of practical reasoning, pro-
viding negotiable motivations for and against different be-
haviors. For example, the amygdala, which has been im-
plicated in responses to personal moral dilemmas, reliably
responds to threatening visual stimuli such as snakes and
faces of out-group members...Thus the amygdala is a good
candidate for a region that is critical for supporting at least
some alarm-bell emotions. In contrast, Knutson and col-
leagues...have identified a set of meso-limbic brain regions
that appear to represent expected monetary value in a more
graded fashion, with distinct regions tracking a stimulus’s
reward magnitude, reward probability, and expected value.
These regions, in a rather transparent way, support currency-
like representations (Cushman et al. 2010, p. 62).
In his 2007 paper, Greene captures the difference as follows. The cost-
benefit analysis that characterizes consequentialist judgment is
a weighing process and not an “alarm” process. The sorts
of emotions hypothesized to be involved here say, “Such-
and-such matters this much. Factor it in.” In contrast, the
emotions hypothesized to drive deontological judgment are
far less subtle. They are...alarm signals that issue simple
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commands: “Don’t do it!” or “Must do it!” While such
commands can be overridden, they are designed to domi-
nate the decision rather than merely influence it (Greene
2007, p. 65).
The “cognitive” mechanism that underlies consequentialist judgment
operates via currency emotions: the process of weighing up requires
that each alternative only offer a prima facie or pro tanto reason for
action and does not dominate over the others, psychologically (moti-
vationally) and normatively speaking. Here is a non-moral example:
The desire for ice cream on a hot summer day is an exam-
ple of a currency emotion: it supplies a reason to pursue
the Good Humor truck, but this reason can be traded off
against others, such as maintaining a slim poolside pro-
file. Currency-like emotions function by adding a limited
measure of motivational weight to a behavioral alterna-
tive, where this weighting is designed to be integrated with
other weightings in order to produce a response. Such
emotional weightings say, “Add a few points to option A”
or “Subtract a few points from Option B,”, rather than is-
suing resolute commands (Cushman et al. 2010, p. 63).
However this is not the end of the story. Currency responses as-
sign a partial evaluation to the different alternatives (guided by some
criterion or other, such as monetary gain, personal well-being, or lives
saved/lost). But the weighing up process, in the crying baby case,
results in a precise verdict: it is acceptable (or even obligatory) to
smother the baby. Moreover, this is a resolute, non-negotiable demand,
if it is to conflict with the analogously non-negotiable demand not to
smother the baby, issued by the “alarm-bell” affective system. So the
question for a multi-system view is: how can a non-negotiable demand
result from partial, negotiable valuations?
The problem is, again, one of functional symmetry. The distinction
between currency and alarm-bell emotions may be psychologically real
and important, but does not pick out the two opposing moral sensi-
tivities supposedly at work in the crying baby dilemma. Alarm-bell
emotions do issue one kind of final verdict (“deontological”). By con-
trast, currency emotions, to the extent that each of them assigns some
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partial valence to a different outcome or aspects thereof (smothering
the baby: prima facie bad; saving five lives: prima facie good; etc.), still
appear to be mechanisms subserving the cost-benefit analysis required
by the consequentialist judgment, rather than being the locus of such
judgment. Currency emotions might be psychologically necessary to
carry out a sensible cost-benefit analysis, but—as described—are not
sufficient to generate an overall verdict.
In search of an answer to the problem, one can consider Cush-
man et al.’s hypothesis that there might be some currency affective
“premises” which are general in content and guide the particular cur-
rency valuations towards particular overall valuations:4
[H]arm is bad, regardless of who experiences it. Bene-
fits are good, regardless of who experiences them. More
harm is worse than less harm. More benefits are better
than fewer benefits. Small harms can be outweighed by
large benefits. Small benefits can be outweighed by large
harms (Cushman et al. 2010, p. 65).
On the basis of such affective premises, we rationally construct con-
sequentialist practical principles telling us to, e.g., minimize harms.
And one might think that this non-negotiable principle drives the non-
negotiable response which conflicts with the “deontological” response.
So, at last, we can perhaps establish functional symmetry by seeing the
“consequentialist” sensitivity as the result of a mixed affective-cognitive
process which stands in opposition to the purely affective alarm-bell-
like “deontological” sensitivity.
Cushman et al. themselves admit that the idea is speculative. But
there seems to be an important conceptual obstacle to the proposal.
First we were told that the defining trait of currency-like emotions is
that they “provide negotiable motivations for and against different be-
haviors”. Applied to the crying baby case, this means that the currency
affective system regards the prospective death of the baby as bad, but
as a negotiable harm nonetheless (a negotiable reason not to kill the
baby). However, according to the proposal in the previous paragraph,
there are general currency-like affective “premises” which guide conse-
quentialist judgment. Since the latter eventually issues non-negotiable
verdicts, the non-negotiability would then be somehow derived or in-
herited from the affective premises on which the judgment is based.
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For instance, the premise “more harm is worse than less harm” seems
to imply a non-negotiable reason to choose less harm over more harm.
Applied to the crying baby case, this premise will determine a non-
negotiable reason to choose killing the baby over not killing the baby.
What we have here then is a currency-like emotion which provides a
non-negotiable motivation for a certain behaviour. But this contradicts
the defining trait of currency-like emotions. So, more work seems re-
quired to get clear on the nature of currency-like emotions.
The alternative is that the set of affective premises which guide con-
sequentialist judgment are constituted by distinctive emotions which
are both general in the content they underwrite and alarm-bell-like.
This proposal would fit better with the negotiable/non-negotiable dis-
tinction, since the guiding alarm-bell emotions, qua alarm-bell-like,
would accordingly issue the non-negotiable verdicts of consequential-
ism.
However, there seem to be two problems with this suggestion. One
is that the “premises” which guide consequentialist judgment—harm
is bad, benefits are good, more harm is worse than less harm, etc.—
cannot all be constituted by alarm-bell emotions. In particular, if “harm
is bad” were systematically underwritten by an alarm-bell emotion, our
motivation to avoid harm would be non-negotiable. Consequentialist
thinking, characterized as it is by the possibility of balancing harms
against benefits, thus could not even get off the ground.5 The sec-
ond problem is that to construe general evaluative attitudes as alarm-
bell-like seems to stretch the concept of an alarm-bell reaction too far.
For all that Cushman et al. tell us, alarm-bell aversions seem to typi-
cally arise in response to particular, concrete threatening stimuli (e.g.
snakes and faces of out-group members are mentioned above, to which
one might add the specific imagined action of smothering one’s baby).
The overall conclusion of this section thus is that neither the emo-
tional vs. cognitive representation dichotomy, nor the alarm-bell vs.
currency emotions distinction satisfactorily carve out the psychological
processes responsible for the deontological and the consequentialist
moral judgments in the crying baby case. Consequentialist thinking
is characterized by both negotiable reasons, such as a prima facie rea-
son to avoid harm, and non-negotiable demands, such as the require-
ment to minimize harm, even when this involves causing some harm.
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While “cognitive” (i.e. not immediately motivating) representations
and currency-like emotions might reasonably underwrite and assist in
the process of weighing up harms and benefits, pro and con reasons,
it is still far from clear which representations and emotional processes
(if emotional at all) guide and underlie the realization that smothering
the baby is the best course of action, given the circumstances, and the
non-negotiable injunction (or at least permission) to proceed with such
an action.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper I have attempted a critical examination of the multi-
system or dual-process view of moral judgment. This view aims to
provide a psychological explanation of moral sensitivity, and in partic-
ular an explanation of conflicting moral sensitivities in dilemma cases
such as the crying baby scenario. I have argued that proponents of the
multi-system view still owe us a satisfactory account of the mechanisms
underlying “consequentialist” responses to such scenarios. For one
thing, the “cognitive”, as opposed to “emotional”, processes involved
in consequentialist reasoning only seem to play a subserving role with
respect to the final judgment (providing non-moral inputs to judgment,
or exerting additional strength to override the immediate “deontolog-
ical” response). In this sense, Greene and colleagues fail to identify a
peculiar system of moral judgment specularly opposed to the affective
“deontological” one. For another, Greene and colleagues’ work on the
emotion-cognition dichotomy and the distinction between alarm-bell
and currency emotions, though promising, still falls short of providing
an adequate and consistent picture of the psychological mechanisms
underlying “cognitive” evaluations and verdicts in dilemma scenarios.
It is suggested that alongside further experimental work, proponents of
this view should pay more attention to the conceptual underpinnings
of their distinctions.
Notes
1Or at least to all subjects whose response was analyzed and not discarded as abnor-
mal or displaying “unbalanced factors” (Greene et al. 2004, p. 398).
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2Such as (1) evidence from studies on subjects with damage to the ventro medial
prefrontal cortex (an area associated with emotions), who seem to be more disposed
than healthy subjects to endorse harmful behaviour in order to promote the greater
good; (2) evidence from subjects under “cognitive load”: “consequentialist” judgments
seem to take longer to make than “deontological” ones, suggesting that cognitive tasks
interfere with consequentialist reasoning but not with deontological reasoning (Greene
et al. 2008).
3Or at least a form of sensitivity to reasons that proceeds from axioms and directly
issues verdicts rather than prima facie judgments.
4Cushman et al. consider this as a hypothesis regarding the origin of consequentialist
thinking. My aim is to understand whether the hypothesis might work as an explanation
of the psychological mechanism underlying consequentialist responses to the crying baby
case.
5Of course it might be instead plausible to think that the qualified premises on which
consequentialism is built (“harm is pro tanto bad”), and their attached “currency” emo-
tions, are historically the result of modifications to original alarm-bell responses to harm.
See Cushman et al. (2010) and Nichols (2004).
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